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*175 province — who, though considered formidable fighters, had been badly treated and irregularly paid. Their mutiny broke Chin Shu-jen's nerve, and he fled to Russian territory, whence he returned to China. The remaining officials in Urumchi then elected the head of the Education Bureau, Lin Wen-lung, as acting provincial Chairman, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai as acting commander of the military forces.

[701] Ever since the regime of China's first modern war lord, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a provincial governor who does not control his own troops has usually been overshadowed by the commander of the provincial military forces. It was not surprising, therefore, that Sheng Shih-ts'ai soon dominated his nominal civil superior. Sheng was born in Liaoning Province, in the south of Manchuria, and educated partly in Shanghai and Nanking. He went to Japan in 1915 and again in 1925 to study political economy and military science. During his second stay in Japan he was already under the patronage of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1926–1927 he served on the staff of Ho Ying-ch'in, Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek on the "Northern Expedition" which resulted in the capture of Nanking and Shanghai and Chiang's rise to power. At this time it was not sure whether or how the Kuomintang would be able to take over the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), and it was advisable to have in reserve a promising young Northeastern officer. Eventually, however, the Northeastern Provinces came over to the Kuomintang under their own war lord, the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsüeh-liang, which left no room for Northeasterners who did not belong to his personal following. The hopes of Sheng Shih-ts'ai went into eclipse, and for lack of other prospects he went to Sinkiang in 1929 on the personal staff of a bureaucrat who had been appointed General Secretary of the Provincial Government. By 1930 he had worked up to the position of Chief of the General Staff Office of the Frontier Army.

*175 As soon as he took over the real power in 1933, Sheng announced an "Eight-point Policy" for Sinkiang, which was to become famous: equality between nationalities; religious freedom; immediate rural relief; financial reform; administrative reform;
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extension of education; encouragement of self-government; judiciary reform.[40] [185]

Before he could do much in the way of reform, however, Sheng had still to cope with the Moslem rebellion led by Ma Ch'ung-ying. While Sheng was taking the first steps toward power in the north, Ma was threatening to secure control in the south, most of which he now held from Komul in the east to Kashgar in the west. By June 1933 Ma's forces had also entered Kuchengtze, in Jungaria, and begun to push toward Urumchi. By this time, however, Ma's ruthlessness and his plundering of the countryside were weakening him by arousing the hatred even of his fellow Moslems. At Komul the shops were closed and the villages nearby had become heaps of rubble. At Ch'ichiaoching, on the main trade route, the streets were littered with the bodies of dead horses. Trade through Turfan had been suspended. 175*

As Sheng Shih-ts'ai at the head of his Manchurian troops went out to meet him, Ma cut south across the mountains and took Turfan, main valve of the trade routes both eastward to China and westward to Kashgar. At the beginning of 1934, when Sheng Shih-ts'ai had to detach some of his forces to face a fresh revolt in Ili, Ma advanced once more from Turfan against Urumchi — only to meet, this time, his decisive defeat. Sheng had been able to obtain war materials from the Soviet Union, including even planes. He threw back Ma's attack and harassed his retreat by bombing the road between Toksun and Kharashahr. Ma himself barely escaped to Kucha, and fled on to Kashgar. There he remained from April to June, 1934; but when Sheng's troops approached, he fled once more — this time to Soviet territory. He was reported to have been seen in Moscow at the beginning of 1936.[41] For some years, Soviet policy was to hold an exceptionally advantageous position. Sinkiang was now to be governed by a non-Moslem Chinese who depended on Russia not only for arms but for economic co-operation. Yet the chief alternative 175* 648

[40] Tu Chung-yuan, *Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the New Sinkiang*, Hankow, 1938, pp. 67–72 (in Chinese).

[41] Hedin, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

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*175 claimant to power, the Moslem leader Ma Ch'ung-ying, was living in Soviet territory.
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There can be no doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in addition to being dependent on good relations with Russia, was genuinely opposed to Japanese imperialism — which, like many Chinese who had studied in Japan, he thoroughly understood. There is also no doubt that Ma Ch'ung-ying had Japanese agents at his headquarters — agents who can be described as adventurous forerunners rather than acknowledged representatives of Japanese policy. Had Ma won, Japanese policy could have followed up these agents; when Ma lost, Japan had nothing to say in public.

The operations of Japanese agents, however, did not end immediately with the flight of Ma to Russia. As late as 1937, from February to October there was a revolt in Kashgar in which the Japanese were accused of having a hand. In October 1937 Sheng told Tu Chung-yuan, a former fellow student in Japan who was then working with him in Urumchi, that he knew of Japanese intelligence agents in the Moslem strongholds of Ninghsia and Ch'inghai (Kokonor) — Chinese frontier provinces adjoining Inner Mongolia and Tibet — and that Japanese remittances to Sinkiang through the coastal Treaty Port of Tientsin in recent months had amounted to more than three million yen. He believed that another ten million yen or more would be sent into Sinkiang. Tu Chung-yuan describes how four important government officials and some merchants with traitorous connections were then arrested.[42]

*175 In the meantime, Sheng Shih-ts'ai had embarked on a period
185 of real reform. His "Eight Points," announced in 1933, have already been listed. In the following year he declared that Sinkiang was to be considered "the New Sinkiang," and that his "Eight Points" were to be implemented through "Six Great Policies." The first of these was anti-imperialism (subsequently to be interpreted in a strongly anti-British as well as anti-Japanese sense); this was followed by rapprochement with the Soviets,

[42] Tu Chung-yuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–30, 62–63, 97.

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racial or national equality, clean government, peace, and reconstruction.

Uighurs and Kazakhs were immediately appointed to high posts in their own districts. All non-Chinese nationalities were allowed to promote education in their own languages and schools. The number of students increased from 3000 in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and in addition 329 non-Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union to study medicine, veterinary science, engineering, and agriculture. Under the provincial Bureau of Education in Urumchi, five branch bureaus were opened: at Sharasume, Chuguchak, Kulja, Aksu, and Kashgar.

The provincial newspaper *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* set up branch offices at the same five places, and another at Chingho. Editions were published in seven languages. "Cultural associations" began to function for Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tungans, Tatars, Russians, and Chinese. Of these the most active was that of the Uighurs, the majority people, with 8 regional and 41 district branches, supporting 1736 primary schools with 124,174 students, and also conducting teacher training and adult education.[43]

For a time, there was even relatively clean government. Under Yang and Chin it had been possible for a magistrate to pocket 80,000 to 100,000 Chinese dollars a year. At the beginning of Sheng's administration, inspectors and auditors were sent out to prevent such speculation. More than any other reform, however, this one depended on the degree to which the system as a whole really functioned in a democratic way. After 1940, when Sheng was officially appointed Chairman of the Provincial Government, he became more and more autocratic and suspicious, and an old provincial saying began to be heard again: "The provincial Chairman may be less fat than the Bureau head, and the Bureau head may be less fat than the Regional Administrator, who in turn may be not so fat as the District Magistrate" — the District Magistrate, as the closest to the people, being the official with primary access to sources of "squeeze."[44]

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 80–84.
[44] Chiang Chün-chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–84.

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*175 178 648 ment as well as the Provincial Government. Under the Nanking-Moscow Nonaggression Agreement of 1937, a through air route had been stipulated. Under the Soviet-Chinese Trade Agreement of June 16, 1939, a Sino-Soviet Aviation Corporation was organized. By the terms of these agreements, Russia obtained priority over other countries in air traffic, jointly with China, over Sinkiang.

*175 648 • 185 436 In 1941 Sheng decreed a second three-year plan. The economic activities of the Provincial Government were expanded through "Foreign Trade and Local Resources Companies." Reconstruction bonds were issued; and the combined effects of inflation in China and a trade boom in Sinkiang raised the exchange value of the Sinkiang dollar from the low point of 4000 to one Chinese national dollar in 1934 to a rate of six to one national dollar in 1942. At the time Sheng left the province in 1944, the rate was five provincial dollars to one national dollar. The boom was largely promoted by an arbitrary linking of the "official" exchange rate between American dollars and Soviet rubles, which enabled Sinkiang to buy from the Soviet-operated Sinkiang Trading Corporation at artificially favorable rates. During this period many Russians entered the province as technicians, but — according to the British observer already quoted, who visited the province in 1940 — there was nothing to suggest that Soviet administrative control was being forced on Sinkiang.

*175 648 In retrospect, it is clear that Sheng Shih-ts'ai was guided throughout by opportunity rather than by principle. Even while carrying out reforms, which for some years were encouragingly successful, he did not lose his concern for his own interest. This concern led him into a policy of sudden shifts in his relations with Russia, in contrast with the policy of steady neutrality pursued so long and so successfully by Yang Tseng-hsin. From 1933 to 1940 he leaned toward the Soviet Union and away from the National Government of China. From 1941 to 1942 he cut off his relations with the Russians roughly and suddenly, and threw himself on the support of the National Government in a manner suggesting he had little confidence in his own power in his own

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It is probable that this classification, the vehicle of which appeared to be a policy more liberal than any previous Chinese policy toward minorities, represented an attempt at cautious partial imitation of the Soviet minority policy. The imitation, however, *did not go very far. Sheng Shih-ts'ai,* as his subsequent history shows, was by no means a slavish follower of the Soviet Union or its ideas. The sole emphasis in his program was on promoting the culture of the minority peoples, a policy which permitted cultural autonomy but carefully stopped short of territorial or political autonomy. Indeed it would appear, especially in view of Sheng's administrative gerrymandering of the province, that his purpose was to manipulate the national classifications which he recognized in such a way as to strengthen the dominant position of the Chinese minority in the province. General Sheng's classification was in fact influenced by political criteria which if not precisely scientific are at least as old as the earliest empire.

The program promoted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was in large measure taken over by Chang Chih-chung when he in turn became head of the province. Like his predecessor, Chang was most active in stressing the cultural differences among the fourteen peoples of Sinkiang. Unlike the extreme authoritarians of the C.C. Clique, he appeared to concede that the different peoples of Sinkiang, rather than such administrative units as the counties, should provide the basis of self-rule. "The administration of Sinkiang," he says, "should be entrusted to the various racial groups and should function under the guidance of the many national leaders of the province." [11] This formula, however, glosses over the fact that the administrative divisions of Sinkiang do not coincide with the distribution of "the various racial groups." Further limitations on the right of self-rule are indicated by the following:

> The Central Government is willing to surrender all political power to the people of Sinkiang on condition that the

[11] Chang Chih-chung, "Dilemma in Sinkiang," *Pacific Affairs,* XX, New York, 1947, p. 426.

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territory and sovereignty of the nation suffer no impairment thereby. The Central Government will not tolerate anything possibly detrimental to the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the State — even at the cost of a war.[12]

In opposition to the foregoing Chinese policies stands the "Pan-Turkic nationalism" of a group of native leaders who deal with the population of Sinkiang within the framework of a policy designed to strengthen their control over all the people living within the boundaries of the province. Foremost among these leaders is the recent Kuomintang governor of the province, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landowner and merchant from the Kulja area. Likewise prominent is Mohammed Emin, an Uighur who studied for several years in Turkey and is counted as one of the intellectual leaders of Sinkiang.[13]

In the view of Masud and Emin, China does not consist of a single "nation" or "nationality" and Sinkiang does not contain fourteen groups of people, whether designated as nationalities or by any other term. They use nationality, however, as the basis for their own classification of the peoples of the province, and define the term with great precision by listing the criteria which in their opinion determine nationality. These criteria are: (1) uniform language; (2) common territory; (3) similar habits and customs; (4) common will; (5) common religion; (6) common race; (7) common clothing, adornments, and other elements like blood relationship. On the basis of these criteria they conclude that the seven groups designated by Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Taranchi, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Tajiks are all of one nationality. In their opinion these groups together comprise the "Turkic nation," despite the fact that the Tajiks do not speak a Turkic language, but an Iranian one.

As Turkic nationalists, Masud and Emin oppose the use of terms like Uighur and Kazakh to represent different nationalities. Actually, they say, the old subgroupings should be redesignated

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 428.

[13] For the views of these men see *Altai*, Vol. I, No. 2, Chungking, April 1945.

III

SHENG SHIH-TS'AI AND THE "NEW NEW DOMINION"

185 When Sheng Shih-ts'ai was offered direction of Sinkiang destinies, history began to record a courageous new chapter—for long a secret and maligned one—in the annals of human emancipation. For Sheng urged that the province discard the old-style dependency tradition and, by adopting a great new six-point charter, cast in her lot with progress. By his Six Great Policies he aimed at reviving long-submerged cultural aspirations of Sinkiang native races and at bringing about revolutionary Sinkiang reconstruction. This he tried to do within the limits of nominal control of the Chinese Republic, at the price of favoring "radical" Soviet ideas, and at the cost of offending other less far-sighted Chinese, as well as many assertedly "foreign imperialist" interests. He has, in brief, made the province into a New Sinkiang *(Hsin Hsin-chiang)*, a remarkable "New New Dominion."

175 Sheng, a moderate-sized, handsome man, with an exceptionally full crop of dark hair and a thick, descending mustache, started out for the region late in the 1920's. Yang Tseng-hsin, warlord master of the province since abdication of the Manchu Dynasty, had been assassinated in July, 1928, and his place taken by the weak, avaricious Chin Shu-jen. Provincial General Secretary Lu Hsüeh-tsu had gone from Sinkiang to Nanking on business, and had been requested by Chin to look around while there for a man of military background possibly suited to build up the army of the frontier province. Sheng Shih-ts'ai was the man Lu selected.

643 Born in K'ai-yüan county of Liaoning, Manchuria, in 1893, Sheng Shih-ts'ai had been reared "in a small family" and amid conditions of "poverty" and "cold." How he managed an education with such meager resources is not clear, but he attended primary and middle schools, and even had some university training in Nanking. There he studied European history under Chang Chi-luan, the late editor of China's most famous newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*. Sheng never seems to have forgot-

large amounts of war materials—trucks, armored cars, machine-guns, ammunition, and even airplanes. With these and the help of Russian troops from the Altai area, the government forces captured Hsi-hu, on the Altai road, and compelled General Chang to flee ultimately toward an ignominious suicide. Then Sheng turned once more to press home his attack on Ma Chung-ying. Had the Russian matériel not been obtained, Ma might have won the battle of Tihwa. As it was, the Tung-kans were forced to flee back all the way to Toqsun; and Sheng's armies began to block their enemies off, both outside Turfan and in the vicinity of Karashahr (Yen-ch'i). Ma's position quickly became so desperate that he began a long retreat to the southwest in the direction of Kashgar. Sheng's airplanes harried the retiring forces with bombs at Turfan and again at Korla, and it was only by the narrowest margin that the Tung-kan leader squeezed past those towns to Kucha. From there he fled to the comparative security of Kashgar in April, 1934. Yet he was forced to leave even that refuge, for troops of the Northeast Resist Japan Army marched in within four months. Ma is said to have been escorted over the Chinese frontier into Russia, and his whereabouts have since then seemingly been swallowed up in mystery.

Sinkiang was not, however, sorry to see him depart, after the four years of warfare. The desperate people were instead only too ready to heed proclamations which were dropped from Sheng Shih-ts'ai's airplanes urging the populace to make "genuine submission" in return for "rehabilitation" and "safety." An army of Kirgizes, Turkis, Torguts, Taranchis, and White Russians, according to words ascribed to one of the tribesmen himself, had at last been formed "to drive Ma and the Tungans out of Sinkiang." All who followed Sheng Shih-ts'ai had been promised, too, that "a new era" had begun for the province; that General Sheng was going to reorganize Sinkiang administration and bring "order, peace, and security."

On first coming to power in 1933, Sheng Shih-ts'ai concerned himself principally with the handling of dissident factions; soon, however, he issued declarations of radical administrative policy, and then introduced a first, and in due course a second, three-year plan of provincial reconstruction. His program was not at first so effective in South Sin-

185 kiang as in North Sinkiang, and his accomplishments have been less noticeable there. But at that, under his administration Sinkiang Province boasts of its modern innovations, such as electric light, telephone, and wireless improvements, of airplane and widespread automobile transportation, of motion pictures, daily newspapers, and of rapidly spreading literacy. These are all the more remarkable in view of the relatively remote terrain to which they have been brought.

This is the way in which Tu Chung-yüan summarizes the great changes in Sinkiang:

> From the time of the "Four-Twelve" Affair Sinkiang has changed politically, militarily, and socially. This change has been the result of a great upheaval, and it is only due to his acquaintance with international affairs, politics, and his personal experience in Sinkiang that Sheng Tu-pan has been able to cope with it. The rulers of [illegible] have long mistakenly felt that they deserve to govern [illegible] great people over lesser peoples. Has not this mistaken idea, which existed not only during the administrations of Yang Tseng-hsin and Chin Shu-jen but which was derived from the code of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Mien-t'ang, has not this mistaken idea really aimed at the military subjugation of Sinkiang? Such might have passed muster formerly but not today. With the boundaries of Sinkiang and Soviet Russia touching for several thousand Chinese miles and with the Soviet kind of socialism and liberty already having been made available to the lesser peoples of Soviet Russia, how is it possible for a ten per cent Han minority to subjugate successfully in Sinkiang an over eighty per cent Moslem majority? . . .

Shortly after his election as Provisional Border Defense Commander of the province, Sheng issued an Eight Point Proclamation which set the early keynote for his conduct of government. Establishment of Racial Equality and a Guarantee of Religious Freedom were primary and secondary in the proclamation. Its other six points were: Equitable Distribution of Agricultural and Rural Relief; Reform of Government Finance; The Cleaning Up of Government Administration; The Expansion of Education; The Promotion of Self-Government; and The Improvement of the Judiciary.

It is more than coincidental that the Eight Point Proclamation made no mention of ties to Sovietism and that its first two guarantees were

those of Equality and Religious Freedom. It is just the kind of a proclamation which might have been issued in an early, purely Chinese, attempt to conciliate the rebellious Moslems. Nor does it seem by chance that next emphasis was placed on aid to agriculture and the rural areas, for that has been a leading part of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's accomplishments. Reforms in government finance and administration also were particularly applicable in a period following the avaricious rule of Chin Shu-jen. The remaining three points, dealing with education, self-government, and the judiciary, are more abstract; but they too were practicable planks for a Sinkiang political platform. 185

But the Eight Point Proclamation does not seem to have received the continued stress that has been placed upon another, a complementary, set of principles of the New Sinkiang.

Once, as Tu Chung-yüan puts it, Sheng Shih-ts'ai ". . . had eliminated internal rebellion, unified Sinkiang, and firmly established government authority," he ". . . invoked his Six Great Policies . . ."

The Six Great Policies of the New Sinkiang are: (1) Anti-imperialism; (2) Kinship to Sovietism; (3) Racial Equality; (4) Clean Government; (5) Peace; and (6) Reconstruction. In them the unique character of the New Sinkiang is to be found. As a unit these principles constitute a magnificent charter, a message which may even match that of the Magna Charta of Britain, the Bill of Rights of the United States, and the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter for the effect it has already had and can have in Asia in the battle for Chinese emancipation. For here, in the heart of Central Asia, a colony had cast off her fetters, risen and shouted forth the dogma upon which she was to stand or to fall. Upon it she built a new civilization for herself, and her message is one to which the world well may listen.

ments came at the cost of bristling armor and ruthless suppression. 579
The Manchus in their turn dominated the Western Regions by force; for they were compelled first to drive the Ölöts back from Tibet and Eastern Sinkiang and then to lay waste the North. When Sinkiang Moslems of the nineteenth century revolted, the armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang suppressed the uprising by some of the bloodiest campaigns in history.

If not the military struggles of these earlier days, then at least the desperate civil wars of the 1930's, described earlier in this volume, have been enough to make the slogan of "Peace" welcome to the Sinkiang masses. "Peace," Tu Chung-yüan says, has been Sinkiang what Lenin's "Bread and Peace" was to Soviet Russia. was maintenance of "Peace," probably as much as anything else that enabled a new and promising day to dawn for Sinkiang.

IX

RECONSTRUCTION

PERHAPS ONE of the most convincing actual proofs that "Peace" was 185
brought at last to Sinkiang is revealed in what her new administration has accomplished. Sheng Shih-ts'ai's record of "Reconstruction" may not be one of unlimited attainment, but it is certainly one of creditable progress.

Chinese say that Sheng did not succeed in establishing a "unified" Sinkiang government for three years. Numerous taxation and currency stabilization problems remained unsolved, and there was still not complete political cohesion. In 1937, however, he instituted a three-year plan of reconstruction under Soviet Russian guidance, and by 1941 the second such plan was well under way. Two institutions, a Foreign Trade Company and a Local Resources Company, have transacted most of the Sinkiang business, and, on a profit-for-the

province basis, have dealt with and for a network of local cooperatives. All provincial banking is said to have been monopolized by a Sinkiang Commercial Bank. Together with a Reconstruction Commission, these organizations have been at the core of the new provincial economy. What the administration of the New Sinkiang has been able to do on the basis of this arrangement—in terms of admittedly incomplete and in many cases generalized or proximate data—is indicated below.

Education

Tu Chung-yüan, himself one-time Chancellor of Education in the New Sinkiang, suggests that, second to political equality, the border has long wanted educational equality as the means to gain true autonomy for the racial groups of Sinkiang. The New Sinkiang accordingly made expansion of education fundamental to her reconstruction program. That is the basis upon which the number of students in the province reportedly leaped from less than 3,000 before 1933 to well over 150,000 by 1936. By August of that year around 2,300 educational institutions are said to have been established in Sinkiang. These included one college of law and political science, several middle schools, probably over two hundred primary schools, around one hundred so-called people's schools, and from one to two thousand private schools. There is good reason to believe that by 1943 there was an even greater number of educated persons and educational institutions.

There has also been, apparently distinct from the above-named institutions, a new and special kind of emphasis on education of cultural minorities and majorities. This has largely been effected through what are called Cultural Progress Societies. In 1936 these existed for the Wei-wu-erh, Ha-sa-k'o, Hui, Meng-ku, T'a-t'a-erh, Kuei-hua, and Han. Figures on the next page suggest the extent to which the work of the first three mentioned societies has been carried.

Students, no matter whether in attendance at the University, at a middle school, or at a primary school, are aided by the provincial government. In the case of the University, the Normal School, and the "First Middle School," students have even been given "pocket money."

October 23, 1942. He has reported that even though reception was weak on the other side, he could hear Chungking clearly. Another sign of the times was the announcement by Chungking postal circles on May 28, 1943, that direct mail service between Sinkiang Province and India had been inaugurated. According to the published report, "After the loss of Burma, all the mail destined for countries by the overland route was sent to Russia where it was re-directed to its various destinations. The opening of the new service has speeded up mail delivery to foreign lands. Arrangements are being made for the opening of parcel service on this overland route."

The wartime fight against inflation and against serious jarring of living conditions has met with considerable success. It is claimed that Price Control Commissions set up "everywhere" have made the Sinkiang price level the lowest in China. Yet wages, correspondent Ch'en Chi-jung has found, are high. Ch'en, walking by a 1942 Sinkiang road construction project about six miles outside of Tihwa, came across laborers who were receiving $12 Chinese a day. He indicates that skilled workers of the province were currently receiving even more.

Serious wage lags in the case of subordinate government salaried employees have been one of China's serious problems in the inflationary years of her Resistance and Reconstruction. This may have been proving difficult for Sinkiang also since many of her government workers, for instance, still receive little more than $200 Chinese a month. But Sinkiang authorities have been meeting the situation for such workers with reductions of social and public expenses, with compensation in the way of reduced prices on commodities, and with small monthly subsidies in such staples as rice, flour, salt, sugar, matches, and oil.

Reports in October, 1943, of Russian "withdrawal" from Sinkiang, have been coupled with increasingly illuminating accounts of new Chinese migration to the province. This can promise a whole new vista of reconstruction developments in the province, and such developments deserve to be watched with keen interest. One of the most immediately noticeable effects has been the announcement on November 10, 1943, of an "ambitious plan" for the modernization of the Sinkiang capital. "During the past three months," the report states, "thousands

185 of soldiers and workers have been working day and night on part of the public works scheduled to be completed by the end of this year. This includes the building of four asphalt roads of over 1000 meters, several macadamized roads of 1500 meters and the modernization of buildings. . . . Over 1,000 old and dilapidated houses are to be torn down and rebuilt, and some 1,800 new houses put up in the new civic center."

735 The Sinkiang representative on China's National Political Council, Sheng Shih-chi, pointed out during the fall of 1942 that there are no beggars in Sinkiang; I heard the same thing from Chinese Moslems when I was in Kansu Province in 1940. At that time one Moslem, a Lan-chou vendor of Sinkiang raisins and Soviet lump sugar, made pointed examples of one of the city's numerous ragged and grimy child indigents and of a nearby beggar cripple, both whining with hands outstretched. "*Tsai Hsin-chiang mei-yu-liao*" ("That doesn't happen in Sinkiang"), he commented with a shake of the head. Tales that filtered through to Lan-chou in 1939 and 1940 painted Sinkiang in a favorable light indeed. The shortage of labor, the abundance of land and resources, the crying reconstruction needs, and the progressive point of view of the administration in Sinkiang all tend to corroborate Sheng Shih-chi's assertion.

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175 Sinkiang's transformation in the past decade may not appear miraculous in terms of superficial material measurements. The task of domestic reconstruction is not nearly complete; and at least partial credit for what has been accomplished is due to outside aid. Yet, with all this, unswerving and successful application of her Six Great Policies has put the New Sinkiang and the interfusion of frontier races inhabiting the region among the major phenomena of this age. In the years between 193[illegible] and 1943 the province cast aside five centuries of decadence and began to play a unique and vigorous part in modern living. Now, in the midst of a magnificently intermingled old and new—the Sinkiang newspaper hawked in a native bazaar, the phone call to Chungking from a picturesque yamen, an airplane flight over the old Silk Road —the Sinkiang people have shown their eagerness to join in the fashioning of a better world life.

SN 563 153 779 155 outlook on life, which results in a remarkable internal social stability of family and community at the expense of personal ease. The greatest Islamist of our time, Carl Brockelmann, once called the Quran "die Heeredienstvorschrift für die Mohammedaner" ("the army regulation book for the Muslims"), and indeed the Quran is not only the condensation of Muslimic religion and philosophy but also the code of laws and the "code of practical regulations" concerning the practical daily life of the average Muslim. From childhood on those "regulations" are drilled and hammered in to the people. The Quran becomes the basis from which everything is judged. The conclusion, that the Muslims do show a strong inclination for doctrinal behavior, is rather justified.

SN 563 153 185 [158] If we describe the nomad as a logical and realistic individual to whom neurosis and psychosis are in general alien, one certainly should not forget that there has been still room for romance in his life: first and foremost, the Muslimic nomads as well as the Buddhistic nomads (the Mongols) dreamed and still dream of the creation of their own empire in which they are the masters and not the Chinese. The Mongols still mourn for their once powerful and grand empire "where the hoof of the brave horse was the only sound and the roaring and bellowing of camels and cows the only noise" and where the Khan of the Khans, the Khakhan, the Great King, resides in Qaraqorum, the scene of the Great qurultai (constitutional and legislative assembly), ruling the Mongolian tribes and leading the Mongolian armies, in the name and as the representative and vicar of the "Eternal Blue Heaven," the ruler over the universe.

SN 563 538 While in the folklore and literature of the Muslimic nomads the Golden Horde and the Chagatai Empire (Chagatai Ulus), Batur Khan and Timur Lenk (Tamerlane) are oft-repeated subjects, the Mongolian folklore abounds in painting the deeds of Chingis Khan and is excessive in describing the adventurous greatness of the former Mongolian Empire.

SN 563 775 771 [829] The Buddhistic conception of palingenesis and reincarnation add another romantic feature to the life of the average Mongol and Tibetan and the belief of the Muslim (after having become a hajji, a pilgrim, or even better, a hazze, one who fought as a soldier against the "non-believers") that he would enter the paradise of heaven (or better one of the seven heavens, the seventh, only when he sacrificed his life to Allah in combat), is a deep-rotted romantic conception.

SN 563 771 As we said, the life of the Buddhistic nomad is centered around his tent and his herds, so to speak, the outer sphere of his life, but the inside sphere is absorbed deeply by religion,

175 the revolution reached Sinkiang and the revolutionists occupied Urumchi, it was Yüan who defeated them. The revolutionists, led by a man from Hunan, one of the many who had migrated to Sinkiang, withdrew to northern Sinkiang where they proclaimed the independence of Ili. One of Yüan's officers, Yang Tseng-hsin, recruited a Moslem corps, marched north and succeeded in suppressing the revolt. With the military power in his hands and with the backing of Yüan Ta-hua, Yang assumed the governorship of Sinkiang. The Republican government formally confirmed the office in 1912.

175 159 635 669 1. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin

The first phase of Yang's administration was military. Oppression of the local officials and crushing taxes drove the Chinese Moslems in Qomul (Hami) to revolt, but Yang soon quashed the insurrection. In Ili, Chinese and Manchurian revolutionists continued their resistance. Yang dulled the edge of their power by negotiations. He recognized their republic as a part of Sinkiang and their officials as legitimate officials. Later, when the Ili revolutionists agreed to accept a loan from Russia without the knowledge of the provincial or central authorities, Yang wired Peking and received orders to seize and execute the leaders. Yang acted promptly in taking over control of that region.

159 175 635 575 668 Another source of trouble for Yang Tseng-hsin was the activities of a secret society known as Ko-lao Hui, introduced into Sinkiang by the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Chin-t'ang. In later years it gained many adherents among the Chinese Moslems. A member who later rose to prominence was Ma Hung-pin, who under the Communists became a vice chairman of Kansu province. During the disorders following the fall of the dynasty, the headquarters of the secret society moved to Kashgar and its influence spread to Kharashar, Kucha, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan. It took Yang Tseng-hsin two years to suppress the organization.

159 635 175 648 On the northern borders of Sinkiang, Yang's troops fought a number of skirmishes with the Outer Mongolian forces who invaded Sinkiang in 1912 and seized control of Kobdo. Hostilities finally ended with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Yang and the government at Urga.

159 635 175 185 631 Internally, Yang undertook administrative and financial reforms. By severe punishment of corrupt officials he sought to check graft, and by the issuance of a new currency he tried to halt inflation. Under him, a million mou (about 135,000 acres) of new land was opened to cultivation. To win the support of the natives, he gave power at the lower administrative level to the begs - Uighur headmen. Since their tenure of office was thirty years to life, they had an advantage over Chinese-appointed magistrates who were periodically changed. In official proclamations, he permitted the use of the native languages. This policy was effective until the collapse of the Imperial Russian government.

S
631 political and military reasons. After the last British Consulate
131 of Kashgar was closed, the curtain has become even more
668 impenetrable there than in any other part of China. Not even
172 Chinese are allowed to travel into Sinkiang without special
(648) permits.

N F. Northwest As An Outlet for Chinese Overpopulation
167 The Northwest Region has been long regarded by the Chinese
185 as one of the major outlet areas for China's overpopulation. Once the plans to conserve water and soil are completed - especially along the Yellow River in Shensi and Kansu - arable land will be considerably extended. But water and soil conservancy will involve a lot of problems before the land is actually made productive - not to mention that its sustaining capacity is limited. Therefore the Northwest as an outlet for China's overpopulation is tentative and should only be regarded as a partial and temporary solution.

N 1. Extension of Arable Land by Irrigation and Soil Conservancy
311 According to plan the irrigated area in the mid-Yellow River
185 Basin will grow from 12,717,000 acres at present to some 19,105,000 acres. Agricultural output in the irrigated area will more than double. Annual grain output will increase by 6,741,000 long tons and cotton by 590,000 long gons. The loess regions with their barren mountains and desolate gullies covering 143,000 square miles, will become a land of plenty. Most of the land for irrigation development under the project will be in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. ("China's Sorrow" Will Be No More - The Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, by Li Jui, People's China, August 6, 1955, p. 9-15).

S The area of arable land in Sinkiang has also been extended,
311 but it is not easy to ascertain by how much or by what means.
• 185 In 1953 it had reached twenty million mou, 4,100,000 more than in 1949 (PD. August 28, 1955); in 1954 more than 5,000,000 mou above 1949, i.e. a total of 21 million mou (KM. September 15, 1955; by 1955 22 million mou (PD. October 31, 1955).

According to the above figures, the increase between 1949 and 1955 would be six million mou. But there appear some discrepancies with other information. The difficulty is that the 1950 data for the extension of arable land in Sinkiang was not 16 million but 18.195 million mou (Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, p. 25, 1950). Thus if the present data are reliable, the 1949-55 increase would be three million mou instead of six million, of which 1,100,000 mou are due to the labor of the Army Agrarian Production Troops.

S According to official reports, in 1953, 1.6 million tons of
433 food stuffs were produced in Sinkiang (PD. August 28, 1955). About the production in 1954, it is known that there was an

433 increase of 11.5 percent in the combined areas of Inner Mongolian, Sinkiang, and T'ung Autonomous Area in Kweichow. (KM. October 4, 1955). Supposing the increase in Sinkiang was ten percent which owing to the heavy natural disasters in 1954 is probably too high an estimate, it would mean 1.76 million tons of food stuffs in 1954, i.e. about 430 catties per head. In this context, a report which claimed that food production is 747 catty per head was published (KM. September 15, 1955).

311 312 185 Soil conservation is just as important as water conservation in land reclamation in arid and semi-arid areas. Human survival in Sinkiang for over 2,000 years has been involved in a continual fight against the aridity of the climate and the central Asiatic agricultural alkali, salt-saturated soil. Every year's floods convert even hitherto fertile lands into alkali, sterile soil. There are "Kariz" wells which are connected by underground canals, reaching a total length of 2,500 km. between Hami and Turfan only. This is evidently a means of combating the impermeability of the soil, which makes surface irrigation harmful.

503 653 According to 1954 Government Reports, 50,000 long or short canals with a total length of 30,000 km. have been repaired by the Army and by the people. (PD. August 28, 1955). In an October 1955 report: 1,600 canals are under repair and also 1,500 wells have been added (PD. October 21, 1955).

311 312 185 Large scale irrigation and water conservancy work are at present in the state of planning only: survey works are going on at the Manas and Urumchi Rivers and at the Turfan Basin for the future building of larger irrigation works and hydraulic power stations. (PD. October 31, 1955). But to fight against alkali soil will remain a continuous problem in land reclamation in Sinkiang as well as elsewhere in the arid and semi-arid Northwest of China. It was reported in 1955 that 300,000 mou of alkali land were reclaimed around Chigalik Lake in the northeast Hami area, and southwest Aksu. Rice has been planted in the former too, and cotton in the latter area. How long will the newly reclaimed land reclaim productive under the ever-increasing accumulation of alkali in the soil is still a problem which remains to be solved.

2. Soldier Colonization

433 648 167 466 Although no data concerning the exact number of Chinese soldiers in Sinkiang are available, the figures must be enormous - judged by the gigantic work undertaken by Chinese soldiers under the name of "Production and Construction Troops of the Sinkiang Military Area." One million one hundred thousand mou (166,000 acres) of the three million mou extended arable land during the period 1949-55 are due to the labor of the Army

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433 Under land reform in Sinkiang, on the average, 2.5 mou were
S distributed per person. (PD. August 28, 1954). According to
[161] the 1953 census - Sinkiang has a population of 4,873,608.
That means the average acreage per head would about 4.5
mou instead of 2.5. Taking this as a basis, the estimated
110,000,000 mou of possibly extended land for cultivation
can accommodate nearly another fifty million people; that
S will be ten times larger than its present population.
N
311 Land reclamation by the development of irrigation in
312 Chinghai province and former Ninghsia along the Kansu
185 Corridor is not as promising as in Sinkiang and the mid-
Yellow River drainage area of Shensi and Kansu, because
of the limited amount of snow over the nearby high mountains.
Another three million people (twice its present population)
would be the most that Chinahai could support by land reclama-
tion for agriculture and pastoral development.

Summing up all the possibilities, an approximate total of another fifty-five million people which is nearly one and a half times the amount of its present total population can be supported at the present standard of living by the development of irrigation in land reclamation in the whole Northwest Region
N of China. According to the 1953 Census, the Northwest has
[161] a total population of 35,359,525 with an annual natural increase at a rate of twenty per thousand as the Chinese Communists claim. That means an addition of more than 700,000 people are added by natural increase each year. In approximately seventy years, another fifty-five million people will be added to its present population by natural increase only. But in view of an annual natural increase of nearly twelve million for the whole population of China, the Northwest can be used as a reservoir for the nation for a period of only four years. Therefore the Northwest is extremely limited as a population outlet for China. And the conversion of 110 million mou into arable land in Sinkiang is itself a gigantic task to fulfill; and conservancy of soil and water can hardly cope with the natural increase in population. Land reclamation in the Northwest should be regarded as a means of improving the living standards of the people rather than as an outlet for any further increase of the population.

/Chinese Moslems/

The Chinese Moslem community differs from the Turkic Moslem community mainly in the organization of the community around the mosque and in the peculiar position the ahung holds in the community. The ahung holds the central position in both the religious and the social life. In principle, the Islamic community has no professional priests, but in China the ahung has actually taken the place of one. The Imam, whose office is important in Western Asia and Eastern Turkestan, where he has leadership in religious life, has lost his pre-eminent position in China. So has the Muazzin (the one who calls people for prayer) and the Mufti (the teacher of law). At present these positions have been practically abolished. Those who hold the title have no particular importance in the community. These titles are inherited and are not conferred by virtue of any knowledge of Islamic affairs. The ahung is the only real Moslem scholar in the Chinese Moslem community. He is nominated to this position by virtue of his knowledge of the details and philosophy of the religion. He trains students, the Khalifa, to become the future ahungs and to continue to maintain Islamic life in China.

G. Chinese Moslem Sects

After the pilgrims had established some contact with the rest of the Moslem world, there were attempts, many of them springing in the Northwest, to reform Islam in China. The first well-known attempt of this sort was made by Muhammad Amin, known in China as Ma Ning-hsia, who in 1781 appeared among the Salars and introduced some reforms concerning the rituals of Islam, correcting some of the practices which seemed not to be in accordance with those he had observed in Mecca.

However, of all the most notoriously successful is the sect of Ma Hua-lung, the hsin-chiao or the new doctrine, as contrasted with the traditional religion practiced by the Chinese Moslems, Lao-chiao or the old doctrine.

The new sect is to be set apart from the rest of Islam in China. In spite of the Islamic Chinese tradition regarding religious leaders, their being chosen by the community to serve it, and known only to their adherents, Ma Hua-lung's name was known far beyond his immediate followers. To some he was a prophet, and others detested him as an impostor.

The nature of Ma Hua-lung's teachings still remains somewhat of a mystery. There is a tendency to regard them as endorsements of Shi'ism, or perhaps as an unusually bold representation of Sufism (mysticism in Islam). However, the notices of D'Ollone show that actually they are genuinely Sunni in character and not a variety of the mystical philosophy widely diffused throughout Central Asia. Ma Hua-lung was regarded as an incarnation of the Spirit—a sheng jen (holy man, prophet)

/Chinese Moslems/

S N 795 792 185 equal to or even higher than Muhammad himself. Most of his followers were uneducated. They believed that he had divine revelations since, without instruction, he had answers to all questions and appeared to know many things. As the founder of a new sect, he had to prescribe certain external forms by which his adherents might be distinguished from others. The differences he ordered are best described by W. T. Chan in the following passage:

"The New Sect insists that a certain chapter of the Koran should be recited once only instead of three times as held by the Old Sect, that at prayer clasped hands should be raised once instead of twice, that after a meal there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting, and that in singing the praise of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. With reference to religious service, the New Sect does not allow any substituting for an ahung in preaching, whereas the Old Sect permits such an arrangement. The two sects also disagree on the basis for calculating the period of fasting, with the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arabic method and the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar Calendar. The New Sect believes that at funerals the mourners should take off their shoes, and stand on a mat while praying for the dead, whereas the Old Sect holds fast to the tradition of standing on the ground with the shoes on. The New Sect also directs that the corpse be laid on the ground, whereas the Old Sect insists on its being on a platform. There is also a disagreement as to whether there should be an honoraria for preachers. In short, the New Sect insists on returning to Islamic traditions, but the Old Sect prefers to keep the customs that have developed in China through the centuries." (Religious Trends in Moslem China, p. 193.)

S N 795 792 [669] Being partly dedicated to ideas of forming a Moslem state in the Northwest, independent of China proper, Ma Hua-lung played a very important role in the Moslem rebellion during the nineteenth century.

S N [578] After the death of Ma Hua-lung, friction developed in his sect. His son-in-law, Ma Ta-hsi, and his grandson, Ma Hi-hsi, fought each other for the sacred inheritance. Ma Ta-hsi had the advantage of numbers and his place of residence, Cha-ku, became an important religious center.

S N 795 Chang distinguished another sect existing in the Northwest, which he identifies as the New New Sect. Unfortunately there is not much evidence as to its nature. He also mentions a Sufi order in the Northwest called Che-ho-yeh (corruption of Jahrivah). The latter is described as "having an abbot, like the Buddhist lama. It is heavily superstitious and is generally despised by other schools." D'Ollone and Hartmann, however, identify this sect as that of Ma Hua-lung, the name Jahriva

planted in these tracts.

668 185 241 We have cited some of the achievements that have taken place and the general direction of agricultural development. We must be careful about accepting all figures and recognize that many targets are not met but often revised midway through the year until they can be met. When one looks at the entire scheme of development taking place it is important to remember that each group in this scheme has certain commitments to meet as set by the plan for that year. Survey teams are supposed to provide definite information about the amount of land to be reclaimed each year. If their information is not accurate, (and there have been complaints to this effect) then those units which reclaim the land are put off schedule, the proper cultivation and sowing cannot be done, and the intended output is not realized. Such intricate planning can lead to grievous bottlenecks in the attainment of planned goals.

Further defects that have been reported are as follows: there has been inadequate hydrographic and meteorological data for farming and animal husbandry. There has not been the correct coordinated activity between State and commercial enterprises to supply the necessary producer and consumer goods for the agricultural and pastoral co-ops. The People's Bank has been [452] unable to give the needed credit and credit cooperatives and credit [453] groups still have to absorb idle capital and halt usurious practices among the peasants, which still seem to prevail six years after "liberation." The Communists report that rich peasants, and so-called counter-revolutionary elements are still causing trouble by "sabotage" and the spreading of rumors which obstruct Communist policy.

According to observations made by some agricultural stations in Sha-ya County the peasants in many districts placed emphasis only on the summer harvest, and neglected the cotton, mazie and rice crops that are reaped in autumn. This meant that the peasants were devoting more of their attention to harvesting a wheat crop, a food item, and neglecting other farm crops that the state was so urgently emphasizing. In Kuerhlei County there were complaints that the peasants were not picking the cotton at the appropriate time and their delay in doing so had allowed much of the ripe cotton to fall to the ground and rot. This occurred in many of the villages throughout the county. Again the Communists complained of the peasants' lack of care for their farming tools and that damage frequently resulted from mechanical troubles and carelessness.

668 241 The principal difficulty to date has been the acute shortage of technical cadres in the province and among the local minority nationalities. To solve this problem, several agricultural institutes have been erected to train indigenous groups. But this